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Three views on utility-generated externalities 
Maine Policy Review (1993). Volume 2, Number 1 
"Externalities" are costs imposed on third parties without compensation. Pollution is the 
archetypical externality. It is the pollution externality that has prompted the emerging national 
debate over whether public utility regulation should be modified to account for externalities. 
Jonathan Raab, Myrick Freeman, and Ralph Townsend discuss the arguments surrounding the 
externality debate. These three authors earlier presented similar material at a Legislative 
Institute, sponsored by the Margaret Chase Smith Center for Public Policy's Project for the Study 
of Regulation and the Environment, for the Utilities Committee of the Maine State Legislature.  
Why include externalities?  
by Jonathan Raab, Consultant  
There are at least two compelling reasons to include environmental externalities in utility 
decision making. The first is an efficiency argument, and the second involves the prudent 
anticipation of the more stringent future environmental regulation. But, as both a theoretical 
matter and as a practical matter, there is not any right way to internalize environmental 
externalities in utility decision making. Rather, there are numerous options, each with its own 
strengths and weaknesses. 
The first argument for the inclusion of externalities in utility decision making is an efficiency 
argument. Even if environmental regulation is set perfectly, (where the marginal cost of 
additional pollution reduction equals the marginal benefits from doing so), there will still be 
residual emissions, and, most likely, environmental damages. When these residual damages are 
not priced in some way, they are externalities. Without an explicit method to capture these 
external costs in resource decision making, utilities are unlikely to select resources that result in 
the lowest social cost. This is simply inefficient from a societal perspective.  
Secondly, even without this efficiency argument, it still makes sense to anticipate potentially 
more stringent federal or state regulation on environmental issues. Over the past twenty years, 
environmental regulation of the pollutants associated with electricity generation has become 
stricter and stricter. Under the Clinton administration, this trend is likely to continue. In fact, 
there is some probability that regulation will eventually include either a tax or a cap on carbon 
emissions because of the concern about global warming. Failure to require utilities to anticipate 
more stringent federal and state environmental regulations will probably result in higher 
electricity costs in the future.  
Resources should both be selected and operated not only to comply with existing regulations, but 
also with an eye to future regulations. This is not different from the prudent business hedge 
against future uncertainty that we expect of public utilities. About ten years ago, the State of 
Wisconsin required that utilities look at acid rain, because of sulfur dioxide and other pollutants, 
when they made resource decisions. Wisconsin regulators expected that those regulations would 
get stricter over time, which in fact they have. With the Clean Air Act Amendments, Wisconsin 
utilities and their ratepayers will benefit significantly by being long on emission credits that they 
can eventually sell. Once again looking ahead, Wisconsin has recently issued a new 
environmental externality rule that focuses on global warming. They are requiring adders for 
greenhouse gases. It was primarily for prudent anticipation reasons that Wisconsin acted both on 
the Clean Air Act pollutants in the early 1980s and now on global warming pollutants.  
We can agree that, all else being equal, we prefer to choose the generation resource that pollutes 
less. The difficult question is how to compare a resource that has a relatively high direct cost but 
low emissions with a relatively low cost resource with higher emissions. We have to decide how 
much to pay for the cleaner resource.  
The Vermont Legislature passed a law a few years ago that required integrated resource 
planning. That statute states that a least-cost, integrated plan for a regulated electric or gas utility 
must plan to meet the public's need for energy services at the lowest present value, life cycle 
cost, including environmental and economic cost. The legislature provided a clear mandate to 
regulators that externalities should be included when comparing integrated resource plans. 
However, the legislature did not tell the Vermont Public Service Board how to do it. So the 
Board has undertaken a negotiated rule-making to determine what approach it will use. Although 
the Board already has a very simplified approach, it is trying to enact the directions from the 
legislature. I am currently mediating that negotiated rule-making.  
Alternative approaches  
There are many different ways to include environmental externalities in resource decisions, and 
there are some advantages and disadvantages of each. One approach is what I call the 
"qualitative approach." That generally means, all else being equal, choose the cleaner resource. 
Most states actually use this approach. New Hampshire is a good example. When they examine 
the resource plans, if the costs of two sources are pretty similar but one is dirtier, they try to 
choose the cleaner facility. This has the advantage of being highly flexible, but it is extremely 
judgmental. It is easier to compare resources with fairly similar environmental impact and 
similar costs than to review really diverse resources like hydro, coal, or energy conservation.  
The second, and the most controversial, approach is the "adder" approach. An adder approach 
places an explicit cost to be added to the price of a dirtier resource (or subtracted from the price 
of a cleaner resource) when determining which resource to use. The adder is used in the planning 
process. Once a resource is chosen, the adder does not directly increase the cost of the chosen 
resource to the utility or its customers. Many states are using these approaches. They fall into 
two general categories: resource-based adders and emission-based adders.  
Most of the current attention is on adders for air emissions. In principle, the same type of 
estimates could be applied for waste disposal (e.g., nuclear waste), for recreational losses (e.g., 
hydro), and for the unwanted effects of siting generation plants and transmission lines. For most 
current purposes, however, air emission is the primary concern.  
Resource-based adder  
A resource-based adder takes an entire category of resources (e.g., coal generation) and assigns a 
blanket adder to that resource. For instance, Vermont's current approach, which was approved a 
few years ago, gives energy conservation a five percent credit when compared to supply-side 
resources. The Northwest Power Planning Council, which oversees the planning for the 
Bonneville Power Administration for the states of Washington, Oregon, half of Montana, and 
Idaho, has a similar approach. It has a ten percent discount for energy conservation compared to 
the supply-side resources. Wisconsin, until recently, had a fifteen percent discount for non-fossil 
fuel burning supply and for energy conservation.  
The advantage of the resource-based adder approach is ease of application. Resource-based 
adders to date have been pretty primitive. They have not really distinguished among alternative 
supply-side options or alternative demand-side resources. This approach is also criticized 
because it is not very rigorously derived. One state is using five percent, another is using ten 
percent, and somebody else is using fifteen percent. They have been essentially "placeholders" 
that give some preferred set of resources an advantage.  
Emission-based adders  
A second, and increasingly common, approach is the emission-based adder. This approach puts a 
dollar per ton cost on different pollutants. Those are then added to the direct costs for purposes of 
comparing resources. Five states - New York, Massachusetts, Nevada, part of California, and 
Wisconsin - have adopted emission-based adders. Table 1 shows the cost per pollutant for these 
states. There is a large discrepancy among adders used by these different states. California is an 
outlier for every pollutant except for carbon dioxide. It should be noted, however, that 
California's numbers only apply to the Los Angeles basin. The actual state numbers that are 
proposed for California are smaller and more in line with the other states.  
Table 1: Emission-Based Externality Values Adopted by States  
($1990) dollars per ton 
  New York Mass. Nevada California  Wisconsin 
Sulfur Oxides  $832  $1,560  $1,560  $21,306    
Nitrogen Oxides  $1,851  $6,760  $6,800  $28,524    
Carbon Dioxide  $1  $23  $22  $7  $14  
Methane    $229  $220    $136   
Volatile Organics    $5,512  $1,180  $20,374    
Particulates  $333 $4,160  $4,160  $6,171   
Carbon Monoxide    $905  $920      
Nitrous Oxide   $4,158 $4,140   $2,449 
(Note: Blank spaces mean state has not adopted a value.  
     California numbers are those proposed by PUC for Southern California.  
     California PUC numbers for rest of state much lower except for carbon dioxide.)
 
The numbers for carbon dioxide (CO2), which is closely associated with global warming, should 
be highlighted. CO2 emissions are not regulated by the federal government and this Table depicts 
a wide range in the adders assessed for CO2 emissions. For example, New York uses $1 per ton, 
while Massachusetts uses $23 a ton. Wisconsin falls in the middle at $14 per ton. The debate 
over global warming continues.  
Part of the disagreement over CO2 adder values is related to a debate on how to choose adders. 
Currently, they are usually based - except for carbon dioxide - on the marginal cost of control as 
revealed by federal regulation. Federal regulation determines the amount of a pollutant, and there 
is a cost associated with achieving that reduction. Carbon dioxide has been much harder to value 
with this approach because no federal target has been set. Tree planting in Guatemala and similar 
approaches are being used to determine the carbon dioxide number.  
Generally, economists are in agreement that a better approach than abatement cost is to use the 
marginal damage cost. Economists have produced estimates of how to value the costs that air 
pollution causes through poorer health, greater health-care cost, reduced worker productivity, 
property damage (e.g., acid damage to buildings) and agricultural and forestry losses. But these 
estimates are inherently imprecise and subject to dispute. Thus, it has been politically easier to 
use control costs.  
The numbers in Table 1 could have substantial impact. For instance in Massachusetts, an existing 
coal plant could face an adder of four to five cents per kilowatt-hour if the adders, which are 
currently only applied to new resources, were ever applied to existing resources. Even though 
these numbers are not charged directly to the ratepayers, they can have a substantial effect upon 
the choice among resources.  
The next approach is a multi-attribute analysis that ranks and weights different pollutants. This is 
a hybrid between a qualitative approach and an adder approach. In Massachusetts, for instance, 
the New England Electric System (NEES) proposed a weighting and ranking scheme. Using a 
100-point scale, NEES would weight the various externalities. For example, global warming 
might be assigned nine percent of the weight. Next, based on the weight, NEES would set a point 
value for various emissions levels. A certain amount of carbon dioxide emission might be 
assigned four points. A lower level might get one point. NEES would go through a number of 
resources and multiply these ranks times the weight and arrive at a discrete ordering for an entire 
portfolio of different resources. Next, NEES proposed to compute a dollar value by assuming 
that the worst plant has a 15 percent cost penalty compared to the direct cost.  
Under this type of approach, diverse resources can be compared and ranked using the best 
technical information available. Once established, the approach is fairly easy to apply (except 
perhaps for energy conservation programs). But the approach may be viewed as arbitrary, 
because it does not directly monetize environmental externalities. For instance, NEES developed 
weights and ranks by interviewing everybody within the company and by polling a few experts. 
But it was not a cohesive political process that involved the ratepayer groups and various state 
agencies. It is very important how one derives such numbers.  
 
Criticism of approaches  
Several broad criticisms can be made of these four approaches. First, they have been applied 
only to new resources. Yet, the older plants are much dirtier than the newer plants, because the 
newer plants meet stricter environmental standards. If we want to decrease environmental 
damages, then we should not ignore these existing systems. This includes decisions about 
repowering, early retirement, and dispatch of the system. But there are a lot of political reasons 
why it is difficult to tamper with the existing system.  
The second criticism of the four approaches is that they only apply to the electric utility sector. 
There may be cheaper pollution reduction in other sectors. There may be some anti-competitive 
or even some counterproductive effects when we focus only on electric utilities.  
The third criticism involves "offsets." Offsets allow resource developers and utilities to include 
in their calculations the beneficial effects of any reduction of pollution from other sources. In 
both Wisconsin and Massachusetts, a provision allows utilities to offset some of the pollutants 
from new plants with reductions in other places. The advantages are obvious. Offsets can be used 
separately, or in conjunction with other strategies that cut across sectors, to reduce the cost of 
pollution reduction. The caution about offsets is that they must be real, permanent, and 
incremental. They must also be verifiable and enforceable. There is great interest in offsets, but 
there needs to be careful thinking on how to guarantee these reductions.  
We also need to consider how the adoption of a pre-determined set of emission targets over time 
can impact alternative externality approaches. The Clean Air Act Amendments, for instance, set 
such an emission timetable for SOx on a national basis. Reduction targets create a clear public 
policy. This approach provides flexibility for utilities to plan to achieve reductions at the lowest 
cost. It may also happen that a reduction target for one pollutant (e.g., CO2) will cause other 
pollutants (e.g., SOx and NOx) to fall. If we reduce carbon dioxide, we also reduce SOx and NOx 
However, by reducing SOx you do not necessarily reduce carbon dioxide. An alternative 
approach to considering externalities in utility planning is pollution taxes. For instance, we could 
tax carbon content at a state or federal level. A tax can be designed to generate general revenue, 
or revenue for an environmental trust fund. It can also be revenue-neutral (e.g., to replace a state 
utilities or gross receipts taxes). Such taxes directly price the externalities and thus provide 
incentives to reduce pollution efficiently. They also cut across industries. Disadvantages arise if 
the tax is only focused on one or two pollutants. Finally, if the taxes are set too low, we will not 
internalize the externality sufficiently to decrease pollution.  
A final option is to target cleaner resources. Maine has been a leader in developing renewable 
resources for electricity. It is possible to directly promote energy conservation and renewable 
technology without going to a more complicated adder approach. Strategies targeted at 
renewable energy technologies or energy conservation can create specific targets that might 
exceed what a least-cost energy plan (with or without externalities) might dictate. Green pricing 
is another option that has recently been suggested. Customers get more renewables than least-
cost energy plans alone dictate by agreeing to pay a slightly higher rate. We might actually 
observe what people are willing to pay to obtain more renewable resources. This targeting, in my 
opinion, may work best as a supplement to one or more of the other approaches.  
In thinking about externalities, there are many "boundary" questions. What pollutants are 
included? Does the process apply just to new resources or also to existing resources? Does it 
apply to the electric utility sector or is it more all encompassing? Should non-air polluting 
externalities be included? How do you compare a coal plant with, for example, Hydro Quebec or 
an existing nuclear plant? Finally, should you look at externalities from the entire fuel cycle, 
extraction to disposal, or only at what comes out of the smoke stacks?  
In conclusion, I want to emphasize that there is not one right approach to answering the 
externality question. Nonetheless, state lawmakers and regulators need to move to internalize 
externalities somehow, or they are implicitly favoring relatively dirty resources. This will 
probably cost society more in the long run. And utilities and ratepayers may face higher 
electricity and gas bills anyway, if utilities fail to properly anticipate future regulation.  
Jonathan Raab is currently an independent energy consultant. His chief clients are the Vermont 
Public Service Board and the Rhode Island Utilities Commission. He has been mediating an 
environmental externality rulemaking for the Vermont PSB since September 1992. Dr. Raab 
holds a doctorate in Resource Economics and Energy and Environmental Policy from 
Massachusetts Institute of Technology. 
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